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In China, May 4 is Youth Day, a holiday established by the Communist Party in 1949 and 
celebrated on and off ever since. On this day in 1989, more than 100,000 students 
demonstrated in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, a key milestone on road to the tragic events of 
June 4, when Chinese troops opened fire on the civilians amassed there. 
 
This year, China’s president and Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping, has called on students 
to commemorate a very special Youth Day. But it’s not the 30th anniversary of 1989’s pro-
democracy protests that he has in mind. Rather, it is the 100th anniversary of May 4, 1919, 
that he wants to commemorate. On that day a century ago, another group of students rallied 
in Tiananmen Square. 
 
In May 1919, the leaders of World War I’s victorious allies were meeting in Paris to 
determine the shape of the postwar world. Most Westerners know that the resulting Treaty of 
Versailles profoundly influenced subsequent European history through the foundation of the 
League of Nations, the rise of Adolf Hitler, and eventually World War II. Some may even 
know how the peace treaty, the Balfour Declaration, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement created 
the modern Middle East. But Westerners are less aware that the Treaty of Versailles also 
helped set in motion the series of events that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Chinese Civil War, and today’s tensions between the United States and China over freedom 
of navigation in the South China Sea. 
 
In 1919, China was one of the 32 victorious allies represented at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Like the United States, China joined the war late, but it had been providing moral and 
material support to the Allies from the beginning. China officially declared war on Germany 
and Austria-Hungary on Aug. 14, 1917, but by that point several hundred thousand Chinese 
workers were already boosting the Allied cause in France, the Middle East, and Russia. The 
best remembered of these are the 94,146 members of the Chinese Labour Corps who served 
with the British Army, but perhaps twice as many are thought to have served on the eastern 
front. 
 
China’s major aim in World War I was the return of Qingdao and the surrounding Shandong 
Peninsula. Germany had occupied the Chinese port city of Qingdao in 1897, negotiating a 
forced lease on the city and its surroundings that, like the British lease on Hong Kong’s New 
Territories, was due to run though 1997. But in 1911 and 1912, the Qing dynasty, which had 
signed those treaties, was overthrown. The new government in Beijing, known as the 
Beiyang government after the army corps that formed it, negotiated with foreign powers to 
restore China’s territorial integrity. It sought the restitution of lands given up by the Qing 
dynasty in the unequal treaties of the 19th century, starting with Qingdao and the Shandong 
Peninsula. 
 
The problem for China was not that Germany refused to cooperate. It was that Germany’s 
territory in the Shandong Peninsula had already been taken—by Japan. At the beginning of 
World War I, the United Kingdom, desperate for Japanese naval support in the Pacific, had 
offered the country the German naval base at Qingdao in exchange for entering the war on 
the Allied side. Japanese forces took Qingdao in November 1914. 
 
As it became clear that Japan would not hand over the territory, university students from 
throughout Beijing marched into Tiananmen Square in protest. 
 
The government warned them to disband, but they disobeyed. They set fire to the house of 
one pro-Japanese government minister and physically assaulted a second. As the government 
cracked down on the protesters, sympathy strikes broke out all across urban China. The 
Beiyang government was divided between nationalist and pro-Japan elements, but the 
protests led to the dismissal of three pro-Japanese officials and the resignation of the entire 
cabinet. In the end, 31 countries and territories signed the Treaty of Versailles. China did not. 
 
The May 4, 1919, protests were the first large-scale student demonstrations in Beijing’s 
Tiananmen Square. Then as now, Beijing’s universities were run on a Western model. Many 
of them had started as missionary schools. Peking University, for example, traces its origins 
to the old Imperial University, which was established in 1898 to bring Western knowledge to 
the capital. Tsinghua University was founded by a grant from the U.S. government, which 
redirected a portion of the indemnity paid by China for the destruction of American property 
in the Boxer Rebellion to the endowment of the school. The nerve center of the protests was 
the now-defunct Yenching University, which was formed from the consolidation of four 
American missionary schools. 
 
These schools represented something new and foreign to China’s established ruling class. 
The Beiyang government’s generals, warlords, and factional leaders had grown in up a 
multiethnic empire—most of the territory the Qing Dynasty had ruled (or at least claimed) 
was populated by non-Chinese people—but the Western-educated students who poured into 
Tiananmen Square in 1919 were educated in a different political culture. They were taught 
that empires were a relic of the pre-modern past and nation-states were the way of the future. 
Witnessing the collapse of the multi-ethnic Russian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian empires 
in World War I, they were eager to build a powerful Chinese nation-state. And looking across 
the sea to Japan, they saw a new one rising to global prominence. They were especially 
concerned that a rising Japan would gobble up China itself. 
 
And so the May 4 protests began, inspiring a surge of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. That 
led to a nationwide boycott of imported Japanese goods and scattered anti-Japanese violence. 
The ensuing May Fourth Movement centered on rising Chinese—specifically Han Chinese—
nationalism. It flowed into but was distinct from the more intellectual New Culture 
Movement of the same period, which focused on the overthrow of Confucian traditions and 
the transition to modernity. The enlightenment values of the New Culture Movement were 
not incompatible with the rising nationalism of the May Fourth Movement, but Chinese 
nationalism didn’t require the overthrow of Confucian tradition. It would eventually require 
the overthrow of the Beiyang government, though. And it almost certainly meant war with 
Japan as well. 
 
In the 20 years between 1919 and the outbreak of World War II in Europe, Japan steadily 
encroached on Chinese territory. The Beiyang government, which had tried to balance 
conflicting demands from Japan, the Soviet Union, and the West, was unable to hold back the 
rising tide of Chinese nationalism. Some of the leaders of the May 4 demonstrations went on 
to participate in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921. Others joined 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Both the CCP and the KMT 
opposed the cosmopolitan Beiyang government, espousing alternative but nonetheless related 
ideologies of national liberation and renewal. The KMT ultimately defeated the Beiyang 
government on the battlefield and established a new national government for China in 1928. 
 
The new Nationalist government faced Japanese aggression almost immediately: in northeast 
China’s Manchuria, in northern China’s Hebei province, and in Shanghai. In 1937, Japan 
invaded China outright, kicking off World War II in Asia more than two years before Hitler’s 
invasion of Poland. Although it is often forgotten now, the United States was then deeply 
involved in Asia. Responding to Japanese aggression against the United States’ ally, China, 
Washington placed restrictions on exports of aviation fuel, aircraft parts, and other war 
materiel to Japan. At first voluntary, these sanctions became ever tighter between 1938 and 
1940. On July 26, 1941, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration froze all Japanese assets in 
the United States. In other words, Japan’s Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor was a direct 
consequence of U.S. support for an independent China. 
 
After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the CCP renewed its civil war against the KMT 
government. The CCP pilloried the KMT as the tool of foreign imperialists, claiming the 
nationalist heritage of the May Fourth Movement. Although the Soviet Union cloaked itself 
in the mantle of communist internationalism, Mao Zedong unabashedly adopted the rhetoric 
of national liberation. After proclaiming the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1, 1949, the 
CCP set about the ordinary business of administering the country, and when it promulgated 
its first list of public holidays, May 4 was designated as Youth Day. 
 
The CCP continues to portray itself as both a communist party and a nationalist party. Unlike 
the Soviet Union, which made a charade of maintaining nominally independent communist 
parties in each of its 15 constituent republics, there has only ever been one Chinese 
Communist. When those fake Soviet republics became real countries in 1991, the CCP 
doubled down on its vision of China as one nation. The Chinese government encourages Han 
Chinese migration to the majority-Muslim provinces of Western China. It spends enormous 
sums of money to integrate remote Tibet into nationwide transportation networks. It tries to 
stamp out Cantonese and other regional dialects in favor of Mandarin. And it uses its blanket 
control over all forms of news and entertainment media to promote Chinese nationalism. 
 
Echoing 1919, the government still regularly whips up Chinese nationalist sentiments over 
Japan’s possession of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in 
China). China has also revived historical claims to the reefs and rocks of the South China 
Sea, framing its military buildup there in the revanchist rhetoric of restoring the territorial 
integrity of China. 
 
May 4 nationalism, in other words, is still very much alive. This May 4, Xi will be giving a 
special Youth Day speech in Beijing. He will surely be hoping that his audience thinks back 
to the 100th anniversary of 1919, not the 30th anniversary of 1989. Xi may be playing with 
fire in promoting the memory of student protests in Tiananmen Square, but as the CCP 
increasingly divorces itself from its communist roots, the nationalism of the May Fourth 
Movement may be all it has to fall back on. 
 
